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“Beyond Common Sense:”
The Resurgence of Thailand’s Anachronistic Lèse-Majesté Law1
I. The Origin and Decline of Lèse-Majesté
In 2016, a Dutch man was sentenced to thirty days in jail for intentionally insulting his
monarch, King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands, after he called him a murderer, rapist, and
a thief.2 Although his sentence was later halved to fifteen days, this man was nonetheless
convicted under lèse-majesté law for the crime of violating the dignity of majesty, manifested in
speech and thought crimes against one’s sovereign.3 Under Dutch law, disparaging the monarch
is a crime, albeit one that is seldom prosecuted. In 2018, the Dutch Parliament voted to reduce
the maximum sentence for insulting the king; in doing so, they reduced the severity and number
of lèse-majesté charges able to be brought in the Netherlands.4 Instead of facing unique
repercussions for the crime of insulting a royal, violators are treated as if they had insulted a
public servant, similar to abuse hurled against police officers or ambulance drivers.5 In passing
this measure, the Dutch Parliament is hardly distinctive, as lèse-majesté laws are becoming
increasingly rare in Europe.
The history behind lèse-majesté, however, remains significant. The concept of punishing
the violation of majesty may have originated in Ancient Rome, but it is most commonly
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associated with France and their convoluted history with their monarchy.6 The traditional
punishment for lèse-majesté was an excruciating, drawn-out death: the wrongdoer was to be
drawn and quartered, expiating the crime of “lesion to the royal body… through its ritual
reenactment on the body of the criminal.”7 The punishment, although extreme, fit the crime of
ultimate treason against a valorized figure. Built from a foundation of royal absolutism, France
elevated their king so that he was not only the father of his subjects, but also the “wielder of
God’s temporal sword.”8 By virtue of this sacred status, any insult or criticism of the monarchy
was rendered sacrilegious. To insult the nation was to insult the king; to insult the king was to
insult God. Lèse-majesté became the crime that signified ultimate treason, and one that
necessitated extreme punishment.9
Over centuries, however, the rise of republicanism and the disintegration of majesty
signified the decline of harsh lèse-majesté laws. King Louis XIV of France famously said
“L'état, c'est moi (I am the state),” but he was the last ruler before the fall of the French
monarchy, with his downfall potently symbolized in the 1789 storming of the Bastille. 10 While it
would be unrealistic to expect the king's influence and majesty, an “accrual of several centuries
of habit, belief, and ceremony,” to immediately crumble, the French Revolution was a harbinger
of the eventual decline of monarchies around the world.11
The American Revolution exemplified a successful post-royalist movement, but while the
war sprang from dissatisfaction with the British monarchy, America’s connection with their
former monarch was not entirely severed. As in France, it would be unrealistic to assume that
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ancient traditions could wholly disintegrate in the relatively short time it took America to win the
Revolution. After England’s defeat, King George III was no longer America’s ruler, but images
of a “political father must still have been strong in an age that could induce Americans to label
Washington as the father of his country.”12 But Washington, unlike monarchs like King Louis
XIV or King George III, had helped found a republic, and dedicated much of his life defending
it. As America’s founding President, George Washington was the culmination of a democratic
nation’s ideals, the antithetical equivalent of a centuries-old royal bloodline. Despite early and
lingering vestiges of England’s kingly influence, the concept of lèse-majesté is entirely absent
from American legal doctrine.
Absolute monarchies have declined since their peak in the seventeenth and nineteenth
centuries. Accordingly, the lèse-majesté laws that helped monarchies apply their power have
subsided as well. In the modern age of democracy and transparency, such laws have come to be
viewed as oppressive and anachronistic.13 Lèse-majesté laws are infrequently enforced, even in
the countries where they still exist. This aligns with the United Nations Human Rights
Committee’s (UNHRC) stance on the subject. In calling for the decriminalization of lèsemajesté, UNHRC prescribes that the “law should only be countenanced in the most serious of
cases,” but even then, should never result in imprisonment as a punishment.14
II. Lèse-Majesté Around the World: A Brief History
The United States is unique, even among democracies, for its indefatigable protection of
free speech. In a 1929 dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. proclaimed, “If
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there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate” (emphasis added).15 Unlike many other democracies, even
the most formidable American political figures may not immunize themselves from criticism.
Although each American president has succumbed to public insults and outright mockery, it is
nevertheless “inconceivable that even the most caustic critic would be imprisoned for his or her
words.”16 The United States Constitution and jurisprudence has worked to elevate the
inviolability and primacy of freedom of expression, which trumps any concern for guarding the
sanctity of the state. In its fierce protection of the First Amendment, United States law is the
stark opposite to lèse-majesté, but serves as a useful contrast for countries that retain the law,
many of which are found in Europe.
Europe’s rich history of monarchies means that lèse-majesté laws still exist in many of its
countries. As in the Netherlands, however, even in nations with intact lèse-majesté laws, these
laws are increasingly limited in scope, and cases are seldom prosecuted to their full extent. Until
2017, for example, Germany had a rarely-enforced section of their criminal code that prohibited
their citizens from insulting representatives of foreign states, a form of lèse-majesté.17 When a
well-known satirist by the name of Jan Böhmermann was investigated for insulting the Turkish
president, however, the section of Germany’s criminal code became a source of national
contention.18 The government eventually decided to abolish the section altogether in a move that
continued the dilution of lèse-majesté. Justice Minister Heiko Maas of Germany said of the
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decision, “The idea of lèse-majesté dates back to a long-gone era; it no longer belongs in our
criminal law. The regulation is obsolete and unnecessary.”19
Similar rejections or corrosions of lèse-majesté law have cropped up in a spate of cases
over the past decade. In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights overturned a Basque
politician’s punishment for violating lèse-majesté, ruling that such a sentence undermined
freedom of expression. 20 The politician was originally sentenced to a year in prison after he drew
attention to the king’s practice of inflicting torture and violence throughout the country. The
Court noted that the fact that a monarch “occupies a neutral position in public debate and acts as
an arbitrator and a symbol of State unity should not shield him from all criticism in the exercise
of his official duties or… in his capacity as representative of the State which he symbolises.”21 A
few years later, Spain’s lèse-majesté law was productively challenged once again. In March of
2018, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of two Spanish nationals who had
burned a picture of the Spanish royal family.22 The court looked to Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression, and determined that it
superseded Spanish laws shielding the monarchy from insults.23
Lèse-majesté has an elaborate history in many Asian countries, given the prevalence of
monarchies scattered across the continent. Japan is perhaps the most salient example, for
although their lèse-majesté law was one of its harshest laws at the beginning of the twentieth
century, it has since eroded. In 1907, the Japanese Criminal Code stated that those who commit
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libel or insult against the Emperor were subject to imprisonment for a maximum of five years.24
In 1947, however, a post-World War II Constitution was promulgated – one day after the Tokyo
district court reached a decision on a case that ultimately led to amnesty for lèse-majesté
offences.25 The presence of the Allied troops played an undeniable role in the outcome of the
case and eventual change of the law. Following the court’s decision, General MacArthur
commented that it rendered all men equal before the law, meaning “no individual in Japan— not
even the Emperor — shall be clothed in legal protection denied the common man.”26 By ridding
its Constitution of lèse-majesté and upholding freedom of expression, Japan signaled its
willingness to modernize and adapt archaic laws in favor of democratic principles.
From this brief introduction of lèse-majesté, it may seem that, on a global level, the law is
becoming obsolete in democratic countries, inevitably destined to become a “quaint and
occasional footnote in history.”27 This path has been thwarted by the resurrection of lèse-majesté
in Thailand, resulting in the “richest concentration of the charge in recent history.” 28 Never
before has such an “archaic law held such sway over a ‘modern’ society.”29, 30 This paper seeks
to explore the causes underlying the intense revival of lèse-majesté cases in Thailand, and to
determine the far-reaching consequences of this resurgence.
III. The “Storybook” Monarchy of Thailand31
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To understand the recent deluge of lèse-majesté cases in Thailand, a preliminary
understanding of the country’s relationship with their monarchy is required. Despite being the
most open society in southeast Asia in many ways, Thailand is renowned for its stormy and
volatile political history.32 Since 1932, there have been twenty constitutions and nineteen
attempted or successful coups in the country. 33 The cyclical nature of the coups and the
continuous revisions of the constitutions have combined to generate enormous political
uncertainty within the country.
A significant turning point in Thai politics came in 1958, when “divine kingship” was
restored as the heart of the nation’s social and political life by the authoritarian Prime Minister
Sarit Thanarat.34 Love and respect of the monarchy became vital to the “re-sacralization” of the
institution, and King Bhumibol Adulyadej was thrust to the forefront of Thai culture.35 Arguably,
however, the renewed valorization of the monarchy came at the expense of the country’s nascent
democratic ideals.
The abolishment of the absolute monarchy in Thailand in 1932 led to its political
sidelining until the specter of Communism arose… Thailand's Cold War dictator [Sarit
Thanarat] revitalized the monarchy in an attempt to rally nationalism against the
perceived Communist threat in Southeast Asia. But the legacy of this revitalization far
surpassed Sarit's Cold War plan. Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX, rose… to the most
potent symbol of development, progress, and nationalism for the Thai nation during the
20th century.36
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King Bhumibol Adulyadej grew into his role as an omnipresent and omnipotent ruler. His
royal portrait hung high from government buildings and marked the entrance to airports and
other public spaces. Today, rousing images, music, and videos of Thailand’s royal family are
endlessly displayed on television and in movie theaters. From an early age, schoolchildren read
about how the king tirelessly worked to ease the suffering of his people in every imaginable way:
providing scholarships to needy students, dispensing university diplomas, providing assistance to
humble farmers, and promoting the arts.37 The national anthem is played two times a day in
certain public spaces, including on Bangkok’s BTS Skytrain. 38 Thai nationals are expected to
stop, mid-commute, and “stand still and straight,” reminding them of the “power of the state,
headed by the king, to reach deep into their daily lives.” 39 The power of the monarchy is a
unifying and unescapable force. “Everywhere, the king's bespectacled gaze [looks] out and
[meets] the gaze of the subject.”40
Rekindling the authority of the kingdom steered the course of the country’s emerging
ideology: to be Thai was to be monarchist. “Not being a monarchist is to be against the throne,
and to be against the throne is not to be Thai.”41 There is no better example of the Thai people’s
loyalty to the monarchy than their unflagging devotion to King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who passed
away in 2016 after ruling for over seven decades. 42 His longevity meant that much of the Thai
populace had known King Bhumibol, and only King Bhumibol, as their ruler, and in that time,
they had grown to genuinely love and care for him. This warmth was demonstrated when
“hundreds of thousands of Thais, at their own behest, thronged Rajadamnern Avenue to wish
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their King well on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of his accession to the throne,” or when
the entire nation kept a watchful vigil upon news of his declining health.43 When he passed away,
the demand for black clothes – mourning attire – became so great that impromptu dyeing
businesses sprang up in order to mute brighter fabrics into something more befitting of the
somber occasion.44
King Bhumibol attained the status of a demigod in the eyes of many of his citizens, a
position that was key to the country’s mythicizing of the monarchy.45 To some of his subjects,
the king was a bodhisattva, a holy figure, “the last incarnation of the future Buddha.”46
Borwornsak Uwanno, a professor-emeritus of law at Chulalongkorn University, points to
religion as a driving force behind Thailand’s special esteem for their monarchy.47 As the
majority religion in Thailand by a tremendous margin, it makes sense that Buddhist ideals
permeate every sphere. During his funeral, Western journalists noted that although the monks
presiding over the ceremony were Buddhist, the true religion on display was monarchism, “with
the late king as its avatar and savior.”48 But although adoration of King Bhumibol had worked to
unify the Thai people, the “storybook monarchy” of Thailand is not as picture-perfect as it may
seem.49 Sulak Sivaraksa, an eighty-five-year-old Thai academic and activist, has taken issue with
this sanctification of the king, blaming this mentality for much of the country’s political strife. In
his words, the more sacred the monarchy, the more unaccountable it becomes, transforming the
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nation into “something beyond common sense.”50 Regardless of the rationale, however, the
beatific image of King Bhumibol recalls the reason why lèse-majesté originated in the first place:
as a law befitting the outrageous crime of blasphemy.
When the late King Bhumibol passed away, his son ascended to the throne in 2016. Yet
upon his ascension to the throne, King Maha Vajiralongkorn was by no means the beloved and
sanitized figure that his father was. King Bhumibol was a pillar of strength and supremacy for
his country, but his son came into power with a reputation for “fast cars, parties, and women.”51
He had spent much of his adult life living outside the country, and unflattering, compromising
images of King Vajiralongkorn had circulated while he still the Crown Prince. There was a
scandalous leaked video of a lavish birthday party thrown for his dog, Air Chief Marshal Fufu.52
He wore a yellow crop top and fake tattoos while out in public in Germany. When he sued
Facebook in an effort to take down embarrassing pictures, he became the subject of ridicule in
other countries, although there was no mention of his outrageous behavior in the mainstream
Thai media.53 While Thailand’s government had succeeding in fostering a cult of personality
around King Bhumibol, the same efforts have not yet proven true for King Vajiralongkorn.
Despite King Vajiralongkorn’s tarnished reputation and lack of legitimacy, his actions
after his succession to the throne revealed him to be a more authoritarian leader than the late
King. Within his first four months in power, he had fired more than forty palace officials.54 Two
former advisors, members of his inner circles, died in mysterious circumstances while
imprisoned under his orders. 55 King Bhumibol, the great ruler who inspired reverence and
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devotion in his subjects, had left his country in the hands of his son, who immediately cultivated
dread. This climate of fear sparked early speculation that the country would backtrack to even
greater monarchical absolutism, a theory that has been largely proven true.56 His unpopularity
notwithstanding, two years into his reign, King Vajiralongkorn has at least managed to retain his
seat on the throne – not an easy feat during perhaps the most vulnerable political period in
modern Thai history.
IV. A “Kingdom of Coups:” The Rise of the Junta57
Thailand still retains many of the markers of successful democracies: a thriving tourist
industry, a rising middle class, and prosperous banks. In fact, the transformation Thailand has
undergone over the past century is extraordinary, from a “poor agrarian country to a mid-level
developing nation,” all while weathering war, dictatorship, and constant uprisings.58 Thailand is
a constitutional monarchy, meaning that, although the monarchy might be considered the soul of
the people, the Prime Minister is the head of the government. Still, the success or “virtues” of a
constitutional monarchy is measured by the monarch sitting on the throne.59 While constitutional
monarchies may seem like a “hybrid vestige of a bygone age,” the reason for its success in
Thailand was attributable to their beloved late monarch:
King Bhumibol’s reign demonstrates [a constitutional monarchy’s] genuine virtues.
Monarchs are repositories of public faith and act as a source of authority outside the
bounds of ordinary politics who can step in when the going gets tough. Particularly when

56

Id.
Buruma, supra note 30.
58
Tom Ginsburg, Heavy Lies the Crown, Foreign Policy, Oct. 14, 2016, available at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/14/heavy-lies-the-crown-thailand-king-death-bhumibol-adulyadej.
59
Id.
57

11

a country is in the midst of rapid change, a single individual who serves as a symbol of
national unity can provide a crucial anchor.60
In 2006, populist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was deposed in a military coup
d’état, largely because he was considered to be lacking in loyalty to the monarchy. 61 Critically,
however, this narrative only reveals some of the story. As an elected official, the charismatic
Thaksin represented the “other Thailand;” he was the Red Shirt candidate, the leader of rural,
working-class citizens and liberal activists. 62 Thaksin’s dramatic rise to popularity caused unease
in traditionalist, Yellow Shirt circles, leading his opponents to name him as an aspiring usurper
to the throne.63 During the upheaval of the military takeover, both nationalism and royalism were
exploited by in order to condemn Thaksin and vilify the Red Shirt movement.64 Despite the
revolt, Thaksin’s politics “refused to die," with proxies winning every election since his selfimposed exile. 65
The political climate drastically changed in 2014, however, when the Royal Thai Army
bypassed any form of a democratic election. Instead, they declared martial law, established the
military junta – officially known as the National Council for Peace and Order – and named
General Prayut Chan-ocha as the Prime Minister.66 Although Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha
pledged to lead the country into a “Thai-style democracy,” the junta instead conferred itself such

60
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sweeping powers that words such as “‘antediluvian’ and ‘baroque’” are used to describe it.67 At
this point, King Bhumibol – elderly, frail, and hospitalized for much of his later years – was
unable to effectively intervene between the bloody clashes of the two movements.68 In other
words, it was the perfect time for the military junta to establish an authoritarian regime.
This short history of Thailand’s monarchy, infused with democratic traditions, informs
the rise of lèse-majesté laws. The Thai people are unquestionably loyal to their sovereigns, but
after a “history of voting,” they have become used to seeing “ballots win real changes.”69 When
Thaksin’s younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, became Prime Minister in 2011, her party hoped
to see her policies lessen, or even possibly repeal, the lèse-majesté laws.70 Following the 2014
coup d'état, however, the opposite has proven true: the ruling military junta has enforced lèsemajesté laws with greater zeal than its predecessors.”71 Thailand’s democratic efforts are at odds
with the National Council for Peace and Order’s avenging and reactionary defense of the
monarchy. In 2017, for example, a historic Bangkok plaque that commemorated the king’s
acceptance of constitutional government in 1932 disappeared under mysterious circumstances.72
In another recent incident, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha berated a student activist who
criticized university students who prostrated themselves in front of a statue of King
Chulalongkorn, despite the fact that King Chulalongkorn himself had abolished prostration in the
eighteenth century.73 Thailand’s explosive decade of political instability – including the
esteemed late king’s death, King Vajiralongkorn’s succession to the throne, and the intrusion of
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the military junta – has rendered this new era a distinct time in Thai history, and one in which
lèse-majesté laws have prospered.
V. Thailand’s Lèse-Majesté Law
Thailand’s use of the lèse-majesté law is singular in the world. The law is enshrined in
Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code: “Whoever defames, insults, or threatens the King, the
Queen, or Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen
years.”74 This law, found in the country’s first criminal code in 1908, buttresses the clause in the
Constitution in the Kingdom of Thailand that proclaims: “The King shall be enthroned in a
position of revered worship and shall not be violated. No person shall expose the King to any
sort of accusation or action.”75
There is a provision on free speech in the Constitution in the Kingdom of Thailand,
allowing citizens to enjoy the liberty to express, print, write, or publicize their opinion. This
provision, however, is quickly limited:
The restriction on liberty… shall not be imposed except by virtue of the law specifically
enacted for the purpose of maintaining the security of State, protecting the rights,
liberties, dignity, reputation, family or privacy rights of other persons, maintaining public
order or good morals or preventing or halting the deterioration of the mind or health of
the public. 76
While these provisions have been part of Thailand’s legal system for decades, the
country’s recent political changes have conspired to punitively restrict freedom of speech. In an
added blow to freedom of expression in Thailand, the junta-appointed National Legislative
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Assembly enacted a more stringent version of the Computer Crime Act in 2016.77 Following this
restrictive law, even the simple act of “liking” a social media post could provide sufficient
grounds for prosecution.78 The Human Rights Watch has cautioned Thailand against this
excessive form of control, stating that the new Act gives “overly broad powers to the government
to restrict free speech, enforce surveillance and censorship, and retaliate against activists.”79 Yet
the National Council for Peace and Order has continued to steadfastly ignore international
condemnation on this issue.
Under Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, government relations with the media has
progressively worsened. An increased number of government agencies work together to enforce
lèse-majesté violations in the media, including the army, the police, the Ministry of Justice’s
Department of Special Investigation (DSI), the Ministry of Information and Communication
Technology (MICT), and the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).80 In 2007,
YouTube was blocked for a number of months.81 From March 2008 to July 2009, more than
8,300 websites were blocked by MICT on lèse-majesté grounds.82 In another attempt to
manipulate the dissemination of information, Thailand’s main cable provider was encouraged to
censor certain foreign television channels that the junta deemed unfavorable.83 Quick-tempered
Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has not shied away from controversy, from hurling a banana
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peel at a reporter to “humorously” threatening to execute critical journalists.84 In January of
2018, he used a life-sized cardboard cutout of himself to deflect questions from the media, telling
the press, “If you want to ask any questions on politics or conflict, ask this guy.”85 From an
outsider’s perspective, the Prime Minister’s actions seem ridiculous and almost laughable. But it
is no laughing matter: the increasing chokehold placed on the media, coupled with Thailand’s
existing lèse-majesté rules, has opened the floodgates for increased arbitrary prosecutions, even
in cases that seem patently unfair or unreasonable.
The 2011 case of “Uncle SMS” is illustrative of the rise of indiscriminate lèse-majesté
prosecutions. Ah-Kong, a poor man, allegedly sent four SMS messages that contained offensive
content about the royal family to the deputy secretary of former Prime Minster Vejjajiva. 86
After his conviction, he soon died in prison at the age of sixty-one. The man’s advanced age,
poverty, and twenty-year prison sentence – as well as lingering questions as to how he even
acquired such an important official’s phone number – sparked outrage and protests across the
country.87 In 2009, an activist named Darunee Charnchoensilpakul was sentenced to nearly two
decades in prison.88 Another activist, Jatupat Boonpattararaksa, was sentenced to two-and-a-half
years in prison merely for sharing an article of King Vajiralongkorn published by the BBC.89
Noted activist Sulak Sivaraksa, arrested for violating lèse-majesté numerous times, was charged
yet again in 2014 when he cast doubt on a sixteenth-century Thai king’s involvement in an
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elephant battle.90 After a two-year investigation, prosecutors ultimately dropped charges when
King Vajiralongkorn personally pardoned him. Despite his eventual pardon, Sulak’s case
emphasizes the broad latitude given to the Thai government to investigate lèse-majesté charges:
the law may apply not only to the reigning king, but to long-dead monarchs, as well.91
The application of lèse-majesté laws in Thailand veers from irrational and vindictive, as
in Sulak’s case, to the realm of the absurd, as in a recent case involving Queen Chammathewi of
Thailand. Whether Queen Chammathewi existed is not a verifiable fact. The only historical
record of her comes from a “fanciful 15th-century chronicle written on palm leaves in an ancient
liturgical language,” which also describes how she conjured a city out of a jungle.92 Despite this
questionable history, criticisms of the possible monarch have been treated as a crime under lèsemajesté. In 2017, a provincial court prosecuted a local of the crime after he posted a crude,
suggestive comment about her on his Facebook account.93 These cases reveal that rather than
focusing on the substantive content of the speech, the junta appears to be willing to make an
example out of anyone who comes close to crossing the line.
Under modern Thai law, threats to the monarchy are rendered nearly infinite. Potential
violations can be easily manipulated by government actors, as evidenced by the illiberal cases of
Uncle SMS, Sulak Sivaraksa, and countless others.94 A careless whisper, a comment on a social
media post, a vulgar joke: any one of these actions is enough to be faced with the threat of
decades in prison. The punishment, especially in the many trivial instances where lèse-majesté is
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successfully brought up, seems draconian, untenable, and incredibly disproportionate to the
crime. Perhaps the biggest absurdity of lèse-majesté in Thailand is the paradox that David
Streckfuss points out: “With each arrest, with each re-publication of those slanderous words,
with each defense of the monarchy, both the state and the monarchy become more defined, and
so, more prone to attack.”95 The very act of charging a violator becomes more harmful to the
monarchy than the criticism itself; in trying to quash valid criticism, more is generated. The
crisis enveloping Thailand is self-inflicted, and it is almost poetic justice that the reactive
military state has become the “primary vehicle for ensuring the preservation of the very
subversive voices it has sought to silence.”96
VI. “A chokehold on freedom of expression:” Lèse-Majesté as a Political Instrument97
The steady rise of punitive lèse-majesté cases in the past decade is not coincidental, but
rather speaks to its use as a political instrument, wielded by government forces as a retaliatory
and unforgiving form of defense. Before his death, the late King Bhumibol himself objected to
the law. In a birthday speech addressed to the public, he said:
“Actually, I must also be criticized. I am not afraid if the criticism concerns what I do
wrong, because then I know. Because if you say the King cannot be criticized, it means
that the King is not human. If the King can do no wrong, it is akin to looking down upon
him because the King is not being treated as a human being. But the King can do
wrong.”98
King Bhumibol gave this speech in 2005, before the coup d’état in 2006. At the time he
gave the speech, lèse-majesté charges were relatively few: between 1992 and 2004, there was an
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average of 5 cases per year. 99 It is telling that the numbers begin to rise after the military junta
rose to power. Between 2006 and 2008, over two hundred cases were tried. In 2009, the number
skyrocketed, with over three thousand cases tried. 100 Concurrently, the number of people who
have proved able to successfully defend themselves against charges has sharply fallen: from
2011 and 2013, around twenty-four percent of wrongdoers prevailed, while in 2016, the number
fell to a mere 4 percent.101
Thailand’s democratic history has faded. The declining health of King Bhumibol around
this time helps to explain the increase of lèse-majesté cases, so that the National Council for
Peace and Order could work to preemptively silence opposition of King Vajiralongkorn’s
upcoming succession. The junta did not want to risk anti-royalist sentiments being widely
propagated in such a vulnerable time of transition; after all, the monarch is the “main character”
of Thailand, the one who, “by his meritorious acts, unites the people, the nation, and the state
ideology.”102 Without such a unifying force, the junta’s own position in the political framework
would become attenuated. Consequently, in order to maintain their “vice-like grip on power”
during a delicate time, the junta has used lèse-majesté as a legal m in order to mete out harsh and
indiscriminate sentences.103 In other words, the law has served as the ultimate weapon used to
stifle critics of the military and claims of corruption, all while reinforcing the military state’s
own legitimacy.
Laws has always been capable of being weaponized, but lèse-majesté is arguably the
most significant political weapon wielded to quell dissent. Historically, regular criminal charges
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could only be brought by a department of public prosecutions.104 In contrast, lèse-majesté
charges may be brought by any Thai citizen against any other, engendering a climate of fear and
distrust. In a self-fulfilling cycle, complaints of lèse-majesté are usually followed up by the
police, who may worry that ignoring the violation will lead to their own incrimination.105 By
criminalizing dissent through lèse-majesté, the ruling junta have forced any criticism of the
monarchy underground, meaning that what would otherwise be open to public commentary is
reduced to whispered gossip and unsubstantiated rumors. “How popular is… Vajiralongkorn? No
one knows, because you cannot have a poll on the subject. Would Thais prefer some other
system? Other than anonymous Internet posts and expatriate critics, it is not up for
discussion.”106 The result is something akin to a witch-hunt, a “black hole in the center of the
Thai body politic” that makes the truth impossible to gauge.107
It is patently undeniable that the Thai government is deliberately limiting opposition by
charging would-be dissidents with lèse-majesté charges. Studies have shown that during the time
of the time of the coup d’état, more than ninety percent of those summoned to military
headquarters were academics, journalists, or other individuals who were associated with the
Thaksin government.108 The lack of transparency and clarity in the prosecution of these cases
also plays a role in its political repression: the Thai state is allowed to conduct trials related to
lèse-majesté in secrecy, ostensibly to protect the public.109 In fact, no such trial has allowed the
defendants to argue or provide evidence to answer the question that what they stated was true or
for a societal good. Judges typically deny bail to those facing lèse-majesté charges, labelling the
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accused as flight risks.110 By shrouding the cases in secrecy, the National Council for Peace and
Order may carry out their political machinations without fear of public reprisals.
Individuals charged with lèse-majesté often have their legal problems further exacerbated
by prison authorities. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), an organization of Thai lawyers
who help combat human rights violations, take on lèse-majesté cases. Their client-lawyer
relationship is plagued by confidentiality problems, since lawyers are only allowed to speak to
their clients through thick glass barriers.111 Even more worrisome is the frequent harassment that
these lawyers face, despite their stated political neutrality. In an interview with The Diplomat,
one TLHR lawyer recalled comments by prison officers: “They always say ‘why do you dare to
represent [lèse-majesté] cases?” In 2015, the junta shut down an event where TLHR lawyers
were set to present research on recent abuses under the Thai government. In the face of such
targeted opposition, giving up might be the safest option. Yet as one TLHR researcher put it,
“We think people have a right to know… If we don’t speak out, no one else will.”112
Despite continued bursts of resistance, the draconian lèse-majesté laws are working to
quash opposition. Decades ago, Thai mainstream media used to analyze and write critically
about the monarchy. Today, they exercise, without hesitation, “self-censorship on anything
deemed even mildly critical.”113 The result is an Orwellian-like, paranoia-inducing state, and an
ideal environment in which to circulate propaganda. In 2015 alone, the junta spent $540 million
on a promotional campaign titled: “Worship, protect, and uphold the monarchy.”114 The
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campaign – comprised of commercials, prison seminars, school lessons, singing contests, and
literary competitions focused on praising the monarchy – had a distinctly political message.115
When he was still in power, former Prime Minister Vejjajiva’s image was plastered on billboards
across Thailand, instructing citizens to “protect the monarchy by reporting those whom defamed
the institution.”116 Current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha dismissed criticism of these
methods and denied his role in spreading propaganda. 117 Nevertheless, the message was
unmistakable then, and holds true today: to avoid swift and unforgiving punishment, critics of
the new Thai order must learn to keep their thoughts to themselves.
VII. What Thailand’s Reliance on Lèse-Majesté Means for its Future
Not long ago, many Thais and much of the outside world thought the country could
eventually transform into a solid democracy. The nation was even termed a “poster child for
democratization in the developing world.” 118 The 2001 elections were among the freest in
Thailand’s history; the 1997 version of the Constitution was fairly progressive; Thai Army
leaders had sworn to “respect civilian control and never engage in politics again.”119 In 1999,
international watchdog organization Freedom House declared Thailand a “free” country,
marking it as one of the only Asian countries to make the list.120 During his reign, however, King
Bhumibol failed to take full advantage of his opportunity to stabilize Thailand’s constitutional
monarchy, instead choosing to reinforce ties between the monarchy and the military.121 The late
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king’s death left an entire nation bereft, but it also catalyzed its politics down a familiar path:
into the waiting “hands of corrupt and shortsighted generals.”122
With the political turmoil of the last decade, any claim to democracy that Thailand has
preserved has all but collapsed. After all, the guarantee of any true democracy includes the
ability to withstand the free dissemination of opinions, public criticism, and scrutiny. The very
presence of a coercive lèse-majesté law that manipulates and distorts the truth signals a rapidly
deteriorating political system. It is no surprise, then, that the junta’s commitment to hold a new
election have been postponed at least six times, with their new election date slated for February
2019.123 Each time, their promise to reinstate democratic methods rings hollower.
Thailand’s growing reliance on lèse-majesté law as a way to stifle dissent is an affront to
democratic ideals. While countries like China have selectively used its laws to silence the voices
of activists or dissenters for decades, Thailand’s situation is distinctive because of the sudden
reversal of certain hard-won freedoms. The junta’s recent actions further legitimize a bleak
phenomenon, leading to worries about the consequences for other constitutional monarchies or
forms of governments. In February of 2018, Cambodia unanimously passed their own, very
similar, lèse-majesté law, which forbids any insults against the monarchy.124 In Singapore, an
anti-harassment law was circulated that would have prevented journalist from pursuing sensitive
issues involving the government.125 In Malaysia, the prime minister threatened a lawsuit for
seditious comments that were left up for too long on a website.126 If Thailand’s democracy can
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break down, then any developing country’s own transition might be less secure than it seems.127
Given President Rodrigo Duterte’s controversial tenure in the Philippines, and the Rohingya
crisis under Aung San Suu Kyi, democracy in Southeast Asia is already tenuous at best. 128
Thailand’s politics affect not only Thailand, but the world.
Advocates of lèse-majesté argue that the laws enforced by the National Council for Peace
and Order work to benefit Thai society by unifying a polarized nation. Borwornsak Uwanno, a
chief architect of the 1997 Thai constitution, defended lèse-majesté on the grounds that that the
bond between the Thai monarchy and the Thai people is an expression of its particular “ethical
and cultural character,” one that forms the foundation for an inimitable relationship. 129 This
relationship, he argues, generates a level of monarchial allegiance and deference that may be
difficult for foreigners to grasp, and it is this deference that accounts for “social consensus” that
buttresses lèse-majesté laws.130 It is true, as the law’s defenders claim, that Thailand has a
complex and deeply reverential regard for their monarchy. But by this logic, the crime of lèsemajesté should not even exist. There would be no need for it, for no one would ever think to
speak ill of a universally-beloved, faultless kingdom. The very presence of the law belies the
notion that it stems from communal harmony. Lèse-majesté was not birthed by social consensus,
but is the strategic innovation of a dictatorial and calculating regime. The argument that such
crimes are an attempt to unite the nation ignores the fact that the law has only created wider
political schisms.
The irony that arises from the Thailand’s lèse-majesté laws is that, in repressing any sort
of criticism, the nation is only wounding itself. The junta-ruled state may feel it is in their best
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interests to imprison critics, but the effort is doing as much harm to their institution as the
censure itself. The epidemic of lèse-majesté creates an underground vehicle for unverifiable
rumors, muttered and passed along in secretive circles. The inherent mystery surrounding such
chatter means these whispers cannot be refuted, causing a self-perpetuating cycle of uncertainty
and half-truths. By forcing such criticism underground, it becomes impossible to distinguish fact
from fiction.131 The junta’s prolonged deception, coupled with its practice of inflicting
excessively stringent punishments, has aroused the ire of a growing anti-monarchist movement.
At their current pace, the lèse-majesté laws will inevitably grow to “consume everything,
at the probable cost, in the end, of the monarchy itself.”132 As history has demonstrated, leaders
who try their best to suppress criticism – like Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and King King
Vajiralongkorn – are rendered “vulnerable to rapid shifts in public opinion.”133 By persecuting
Thais, the “moral guardians” enforcing lèse-majesté are “adding to the anger against Bangkok's
elite and, perhaps, fanning the flames of republicanism.” 134 In their overzealous enforcement of
the law, Thailand has compelled a state-sanctioned, tyrannical form of loyalty. What its leaders
fail to grasp is that coercion fails to engender true fidelity, but rather masks a simmering and
dangerous resentment. The end result is intolerance and violence, “a precarious and fragile unity
born of repression.”135 Centuries of history has already taught countries all over the world that
lèse-majesté will never work to completely eradicate dissent. The law only work to muddy the
truth, constrain freedoms, and sow deep pockets of discord within society. In desperately relying
on lèse-majesté to cling to power, the junta is inadvertently stoking a rebellion. Dissidents who
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dare to speak up for their dreams of a fairer and more democratic future may be losing the
current battle, but will emerge victorious in the war.
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